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Abstract
Strategic alliances form a vital part of today’s business environment.  The sheer variety of collaborative
forms is notable - which include R&D coalitions, marketing and distribution agreements, franchising, co-
production agreements, licensing, consortiums and joint ventures. Here we define a strategic alliance as a
cooperative agreement between two or more autonomous firms pursuing common objectives or working
towards solving common problems through a period of sustained interaction.  A distinction is commonly
made between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ inter-firm alliances.  Informal alliances involve voluntary contact
and interaction while in formal alliances cooperation is governed by a contractual agreement.  The
advantage of formal alliances is the ability to put in place IPR clauses, confidentially agreements and other
contractual measures designed to safeguard the firm against knowledge spill-over.  However, these
measures are costly to instigate and police.  By contrast, a key attraction of informal relationships is their
low co-ordination costs.  Informal know-how trading is relatively simple, uncomplicated and more flexible,
and has been observed in a number of industries.
A number of factors affecting firms’ decisions to cooperate or not cooperate within strategic alliances have
been raised in the literature.  In this paper we consider three factors in particular: the relative costs of
coordinating activity through strategic alliances vis-à-vis the costs of coordinating activity in-house, the
degree of uncertainty present in the competitive environment, and the feedback between individual
decision-making and industry structure.  Whereas discussion of the first two factors is well developed in the
strategic alliance literature, the third factor has hitherto only been addressed indirectly.  The contribution to
this under-researched area represents an important contribution of this paper to the current discourse.  In
order to focus the discussion, the paper considers the formation of horizontal inter-firm strategic alliances
in dynamic product markets.  These markets are characterised by rapid rates of technological change, a
high degree of market uncertainty, and high rewards (supernormal profits) for successful firms offset by
shortening life cycles.
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21. INTRODUCTION*
Strategic alliances form a vital part of today’s business environment.  The sheer variety
of collaborative forms is notable - which include R&D coalitions, marketing and
distribution agreements, franchising, co-production agreements, licensing, consortiums
and joint ventures – as is the range of suggested benefits attributable to the formation of
strategic alliances.  The suggested benefits include the reduction of barriers to foreign
entry (Beamish and Banks, 1987; Banerji and Sambharya, 1998), firm emergence and
growth (Hansen, 1995; Larson and Starr, 1993; Stuart, Hoang and Hybels, 1999), the
reduction of environmental uncertainty (Dickson and Weaver, 1997), internalisation
(Yoshino and Rangan, 1995), meeting technological needs (Hagedoorn, 1993; Tyler and
Steensma, 1995), and learning (Lundvall and Johnson, 1994; Powell, Koput, and Smith-
Doerr, 1996).
Here we define a strategic alliance as a cooperative agreement between two or more
autonomous firms pursuing common objectives or working towards solving common
problems through a period of sustained interaction.  A distinction is commonly made
between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ inter-firm alliances (Ibarra, 1992).  Informal alliances
involve voluntary contact and interaction while in formal alliances cooperation is
governed by a contractual agreement.  The advantage of formal alliances is the ability to
put in place IPR clauses, confidentially agreements and other contractual measures
designed to safeguard the firm against knowledge spill-over.  However, these measures
are costly to instigate and police.  By contrast, a key attraction of informal relationships is
their low co-ordination costs.  Informal know-how trading is relatively simple,
uncomplicated and more flexible, and has been observed in a number of industries
(Håkansson and Johanson, 1988; von Hippel, 1989).
A number of factors affecting firms’ decisions to cooperate or not cooperate within
strategic alliances have been raised in the literature.  In this paper we consider three
factors in particular: the relative costs of coordinating activity through strategic alliances
vis-à-vis the costs of coordinating activity in-house, the degree of uncertainty present in
the competitive environment, and the feedback between individual decision-making and
industry structure.  Whereas discussion of the first two factors is well developed in the
strategic alliance literature, the third factor has hitherto only been addressed indirectly
(Hite and Hesterly, 2001).  The contribution to this under-researched area represents an
important contribution of this paper to the current discourse.  In order to focus the
discussion, the paper considers the formation of horizontal inter-firm strategic alliances in
dynamic product markets.  These markets are characterised by rapid rates of
technological change, a high degree of market uncertainty, and high rewards
(supernormal profits) for successful firms offset by shortening life cycles.
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3In order to address these research issues, the paper applies the self-organisation
modelling approach developed by Eigen, Haken and Prigogine.  Following Silverberg’s 1
discussion of the relevance of the approach to economics in general, the current paper
applies the approach to the study of inter-firm strategic alliances for the first time.  The
merit of this application will be judged on the ability to highlight new phenomena and/or
shed fresh light on previously researched phenomena.  For this reason, the paper adopts
the following structure.  Section 2 of the paper identifies the key properties of self-
organising systems: thermodynamic openness, local interaction amongst heterogeneous
agents, non-linearlity and emergence.  Section 3 compares and contrasts a self-
organisation perspective of strategic alliances with the established transaction-cost and
resource-based perspectives.  This prepares the way for the formal model of strategic
alliances presented in section 4.  Through this model we consider the implications of
coordination costs, dynamic uncertainty, and firm-industry feedbacks on the formation of
strategic alliances.
2. SELF-ORGANISATION THEORY
Self-organisation theory is, to date, overwhelmingly the product of research conducted in
the natural science disciplines of physics, chemistry and biology.  Classic contributions to
the area include von Bertalanffy (1968), Haken (1978) and Prigogine (1980).  The
principal characteristics of self-organising systems are outlined by Prigogine (1980), and
Forrest and Jones (1994).  The fundamental research question addressed is ‘Where does
order come from?’.  The general laws of thermodynamics suggest that dynamic processes
will follow a path of least energy until the system finds a thermodynamic equilibrium,
where it will remain unless it is externally perturbed.  Yet the physical world abounds
with systems that maintain a high internal energy and organisation that, at least at first
sight, appear to defy the laws of physics.  Rather than moving towards a state of
maximum entropy (total chaos) it appears that organisation arises from initially
disordered conditions.
The first, and most commonly noted, condition for a self-organising physical ‘system’
(such as an organism or a population) is thermodynamic openness.  A self-organising
system exchanges energy and/or mass with its environment such that there is a nonzero
flow of energy through the system.  If this is not the case then, according to the second
law of thermodynamics, all available usable energy in the system will be used up and the
system will approach a state of maximum entropy (a thermodynamic equilibrium).  A
system can avoid collapsing into an equilibrium providing it is able to import usable
energy from its environment and export entropy back to it.  The system does not violate
the second law of thermodynamics because it is part of a larger system-environment unit.
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4This entropy-exporting dynamic is the fundamental feature of what chemists and
physicists call dissipative structures.  It is often said that physical systems that are self-
organising are ‘far from’ thermodynamic equilibrium.  It is presumably more accurate to
state that a system only needs to be far enough to avoid collapsing into a local
equilibrium condition.  If a system is neither at nor near equilibrium, then it will be
undergoing some form of change in behaviour and is said to be dynamic.
A second characteristic of self-organising systems is local interaction between
heterogeneous individuals or elements.  All natural systems have inherently local
interactions, every event having some location and some range of effect (Kawata and
Toquenaga, 1994).  The focus on local interaction goes hand-in-hand with a bottom-up
approach to systems modelling that emphasises variety in micro behaviour.  Higher-level
structures, it is argued, are the product of subtle differences within a heterogeneous
community and the local interactions that occur between the individual members
(component elements) of a community.  Small differences can lead to larger differences,
such as changes in the population gene frequencies, size or location that in turn can have
cascading effects at still larger scales.  This has important implications for
methodological practice in both natural and social sciences.  One cannot, it is argued,
deduce macro behaviour from the behaviour of an ‘average’ or ‘representative’
individual.  For example, one cannot understand the collective rationality and operation
of an ant colony through the study of an individual ant.  Equally, one is unable to derive
collective rationality in economic phenomena, such as the formation of strategic
alliances, through the construction of abstract representative agents.  Rather, macro
phenomena such as strategic alliances are a product of the interactions of heterogeneous
firms.  As with the ant colony example, complex dynamics of the macro structure arise
from the interaction of heterogeneous individuals pursuing very simple behavioural rules.
A self-organisation perspective of strategic alliances highlights the heterogeneity of
firms, the rules that govern their individual behaviour, and the rules governing the
interaction between firms.
A third characteristic of self-organisation models is the non-linearity of local interactions
between the individual agents or elements making up a system.  A system may contain a
number of feedback loops, some of which are positive and some negative.  Self-
organisation can either occur when feedback loops exist among component parts, or else
between lower and higher hierarchical levels.  One of the most interesting, but still
imprecise, propositions of self-organisation theory is that of ‘emergence’ (Crutchfield,
1994).  This states that higher-order phenomena can spontaneously arise from the
interactions of the lower parts.  In itself this does not seem particularly contentious.
Indeed emergence is a key property underpinning not just economics but all social theory.
If systems were simply reducible to atomistic individuals then there would be no need to
investigate the economic (or any other) interactions between individuals.  Silverberg et
al. (1988) observe that in economics we see “complex interdependent dynamical systems
unfolding in historical, i.e. irreversible, time, economic agents, who make decision today
the correctness of which will only be revealed considerably later, are confronted with
5irreducible uncertainty and holistic interactions between each other and with aggregate
variables” (Silverberg et al., 1988, p.1036, italics in original).  Thus the emergence
property is linked to the presence of multi-scale effects in self-organising systems.
Small-scale interactions produce a ‘field’ at the macro level that in turn influences and
modifies activity at the small-scale.
3. ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON STRATEGIC ALLIANCE
FORMATION
Having identified the key properties of self-organising systems, we next consider its
application to the study of strategic alliance formation.  As noted above, the core
concepts and modelling methods of self-organisation theory have been formulated within
natural science disciplines.  Transferring and applying these to the social domain is a
non-trivial issue which must be conducted with care.  Furthermore, the success of such a
venture will be judged on the ability to highlight new phenomena and/or shed fresh light
on previously researched phenomena.  To this end, we contrast the self-organisation
perspective with the transaction cost and resource-based perspectives.  Both the
transaction cost and resource-based perspectives are well established within the area.  Of
course it is beyond the scope of any single paper to conduct a comparison that considers
all possible types and modes of strategic alliance.  Hence, for the purpose of this paper,
we narrow the scope of the discussion to the formation of horizontal alliances through
which firms seek to strategically cooperate in their innovation policies.  Of particular
importance is the way in which different ‘stylised facts’ of innovation in dynamic
markets can be brought together under the self-organisation rubric.   The analysis in turn
prepares the way for the formal model of strategic alliances presented in section 4 and its
consideration of coordination costs, dynamic uncertainty, and firm-industry feedbacks on
the formation of strategic alliances.
3.1 Transactions cost analysis
The transactions cost approach to strategic alliances is perhaps the most well developed
in the area.  According to this approach, economising on transactions costs is the most
important criterion affecting the choice of governance structure for economic
coordination.  In transaction cost economics, a firm’s ownership decision centres on
minimising the sum of transaction costs and production costs.  Transactions costs are
incurred by activities associated with exchange - notably, the writing and enforcing of
contracts - while production costs are those costs of learning, organising and managing
production arising from the coordination of activities in-house.  The cost of writing and
enforcing of contracts is affected by five factors: asset specificity, uncertainty, information
6asymmetry, frequency of transactions, and opportunism (Williamson, 1975).  Since the
internalisation of activities is an effective means of controlling transactions costs, internal
development within the firm will be preferred when the transactions costs of an exchange
are high and production costs are low.  By contrast, market exchanges will be preferred
when production costs are high and transaction costs are low.
The original focus of Williamson’s seminal work on transactions costs (Williamson,
1975, 1981) was the rise of hierarchies in response to market failures.  The proliferation
of strategic alliances in the 1980s and 1990s was largely beyond the explanatory scope of
the theory.  Responding to this criticism, Williamson (1983, 1991) and other transaction
cost theorists (e.g. Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Hennart, 1988; Jones and Hill, 1988)
have sought to extend the analysis by viewing strategic alliances as a hybrid mode of
governance between markets and the internal coordination of production.  Strategic
alliances combine features of internalisation and market exchanges because a joint
venture partially internalises an exchange.  Contracts are still needed but, since these are
often incomplete, much of the activity will be left to joint coordination.  According to the
transactions costs approach, alliances are preferred when transactions costs are
intermediate.  However, if a transaction is characterised by a high degree of asset
specificity then it will be handled internally within a single firm.  If an alliance is
established under such conditions then, the transaction costs approach predicts, it will be
unstable due to the high risk of opportunistic behaviour amongst the partners.
3.2 Resource-based perspective
Asset specificity is the cornerstone of the resource-based approach, although its
perspective and predictions differ significantly to the transactions costs approach.  The
resource-based approach emphasises value maximisation (as opposed to cost
minimisation) through the pooling and utilisation of valuable resources.  Forging an
alliance enables a firm to focus resources on its core skills and competences while
acquiring other components or capabilities it cannot obtain through markets.  There are
two primary motives for participating in a strategic alliance: to acquire allies’
organisational know-how and other resources, or to retain and develop one’s own
resources by combining them with another’s resources (Kogut, 1988; Prahalad and
Hamel, 1990).
The resource-based approach dates back to the work of Penrose (1959), who views the
firm as a bundle of physical, human and organisational resources.  Physical resources
include tangible assets such as land, plant and equipment, as well as intangible assets such as
brand name, copyright and patents.  Human resources include the education, training,
experience and skills of individual staff, while organisational resources include corporate
culture, organisational structure, rules and procedures of the firm.  Penrose emphasises that
7it is the services of these resources which are of interest, not the resources in and of
themselves.  The capability of a firm is its capacity to perform an activity as a result of
organising and coordinating the productive services of a group of resources.
Resource-based theorists highlight the heterogeneity of resource portfolios across firms
(Barney, 1991).  Valuable resources (or ‘competences’) are to a greater or lesser extent
firm-specific and cumulative.  They are usually scarce, imperfectly imitable, and lacking
in direct substitutes because they partly take the form of tacit knowledge, and are
embedded in individual employees, teams, organisation structures and organisation
cultures.  As a consequence, learning is cumulative and path-dependent, and in turn
affects the absorptive capacity of firms, maintaining resource heterogeneity over time
(Nelson and Winter, 1982; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Peteraf, 1993).
The distribution of firm resources are, according to this view, the key factor governing
the likelihood of firms entering into strategic alliances.  Strategic alliances are preferred
when the critical inputs required to pursue an opportunity are owned by different parties
and these resources cannot be efficiently obtained through market exchanges or mergers
and acquisitions. This may be due to the extent to which assets such as knowledge and
technology are highly tacit and are inseparable from the organisational structures,
practices and other assets of the owner firms (Dosi, 1988), or where the requisite level of
knowledge is lacking and cannot be developed within an acceptable timeframe or cost
(Madhok, 1997; Mowery et al., 1998).  Under these conditions, firms can mutually
benefit through aggregation, sharing or exchanging valuable resources with other firms
within a strategic alliance.
The competitive advantage of an alliance, once formed, depends on the extent to which
partners’ complementary assets are effectively aligned.  Each partner should bring to an
alliance a unique and non-redundant asset that strengthens the overall resource base of
the alliance (Deeds and Hill, 1996; Harrigan, 1985; Hill and Hellriegel, 1994).  The
predictions of resource-based theorists can differ significantly to those of transaction
costs theorists.   Notably, whereas transaction costs theory suggests alliances are unstable
if assets are highly specific, resource-based theory proposes that, despite assets being
highly specific, a strategic alliance will be stable provided the benefits are evenly
distributed amongst the members.
A criticism that can be raised against both perspectives is the implicit assumptions made
about firms’ processing capabilities.  Despite both views accepting notions of bounded
rationality, the learning rules that are specified are highly demanding and unlikely to be
met in reality.  This is most pronounced in the transactions cost approach but, equally, it
is prevalent in the resource-based approach.  Take, for example, von Hippel’s (1989)
study of informal know-how trading.  Von Hippel suggests that informal know-how
trading is a voluntary exchange of technical information and, as such, represents a
8process designed to initiate technological spill-overs.  There are, he argues, good strategic
reasons for this.  If the value of the information each firm is willing to release is less than
the expected value of reciprocated information then firms will exchange their knowledge
voluntarily.  The argument is interesting but, for this process to continue over time,
strong assumptions are made about firms’ abilities to evaluate and process information
and its potential value.
Empirically, much of the debate between transaction cost and resource-based theories has
focused on the costs of coordinating activity through strategic alliances compared with
the costs of coordination within the integrated firm.  Transaction cost scholars have
tended to highlight those costs associated with coordinating activity within alliances that
are not by the integrated firm.  Notably, partnering firms incur costs associated with
searching for reliable partners and designing contracts and other mechanisms that
discourage opportunism and monitor the behaviour of alliance partners (Klein et al.,
1978; Kranton, 1996).  In favour of internal integration, transaction costs writers have
emphasised that contracts are an extremely imperfect tool for controlling opportunism
(Crocker and Masten, 1991).  At the same time, researchers such as Lyons et al. (1990)
and Cavantio (1992) argue that the costs of coordinating activity within alliances
outweigh the benefits.
Resource-based scholars observe that the transaction cost contribution tends to be biased,
both in its neglect of coordination costs associated with activities conducted within the
integrated firm and the narrowing of discussion to contacts to the neglect of other forms
of monitoring and control.  Resource-based scholars highlight empirical evidence that
suggests increasing the relational content of an exchange - through the formation of trust
relationships, continuity expectations and communication strategies - discourages
opportunistic behaviour (Noordeweir et al., 1990; Heide and Miner, 1992; Ring and van
de Ven, 1992).  The tangible and non-tangible assets created within an alliance can also
deter opportunistic behaviour.  These include non-recoverable assets such as limited
purpose technology, and specialised physical assets and know-how that have limited
value outside the alliance (Parkhe, 1993).  Finally, there is evidence to suggest that
(re)negotiation costs associated with contracts are not constant but fall over time as a
strategic alliance matures (Artz and Bush, 2000).
The theoretical and empirical debates between transaction cost and resource-based
scholars omit a number of key issues which, we suggest, are as important as relative costs
of coordination and the degree of asset specificity.  Notably, there is the degree to which
decisions are affected by the institutional conditions prevailing within an industry, and
the relationship market uncertainty and asset specificity.  Transaction cost and resource-
based theories both assume that market uncertainty and asset specificity are independent
variables.  Yet market uncertainty may actually be a catalyst driving asset specific
investments (also see Artz and Bush, 2000).  In this event, debates regarding relative
coordination costs largely miss the point.  Research should focus on the extent to which
9different levels of market uncertainty affect the formation of strategic alliances.  In order
to begin unpacking these issues, we next consider a self-organisation perspective of
strategic alliances.
3.3 SELF-ORGANISATION PERSPECTIVE
The self-organisation perspective can be used to bring together a series of stylised facts of
innovation that are not readily dealt with by either the transaction cost or the resource-
based perspective.  We shall proceed by applying the four key principles of self-
organisation: thermodynamic openness, local interaction, non-linearity, and emergence.
3.3.1 Thermodynamic openness
In contrast to the internalist approaches of both transaction cost and resource base
theories, the self-organisation approach seeks to explain the maintenance of variety and
internal organisational stability through thermodynamic openness with the external
environment.  In order to operationalise the self-organisation approach, one must first
define the system and its environment.  The system is the object of analysis.  In this case
the system is the industrial sector in which factors may be operating to encourage the
formation of strategic alliances in innovation.  These sectors are thermodynamically open
with respect to technological innovations in other sectors and also to the application and
development of new scientific breakthroughs.  Interactions between scientific and
technological knowledge bases are complex and non-linear with numerous feedbacks
(Freeman, 1974; Swann, 1996).  The chain-link model of science and technology first
developed by Rosenberg and Kline (Rosenberg, 1982; Kline and Rosenberg, 1986;
Rosenberg, 1992) highlights the multitude of interactions that link every phase of the
innovation process within industrial organisations and the wider economic, scientific and
technological environment in which organisations operate.  New knowledge generated in
one area can therefore have multiple positive spill-over effects as it diffuses across other
areas.  Technological evolution is also characterised by mutual interdependencies
between different core technologies.  New opportunities can be created through the
fusion and synthesis of what were previously thought to be unrelated knowledge fields
(Basalla, 1988; Mokyr, 1990; Kodama, 1996).  Kodama (1996), for example, has
highlighted  the ability of Japanese companies, operating in stable keiretzu networks, to
identify new mutual interdependencies between different core technologies.
The existence of these complex interwoven linkages is an important factor in explaining
why R&D ties can extend well beyond one product life cycle.  Additionally, a link has
been suggested between the increased prevalence of collaboration and the increasing
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complexity of the problem-solving process.  First, the number of different knowledge
fields that must be mastered has proliferated (Senker and Faulkner, 1992; Kodama,
1996).  Second, the rate of technical and scientific change appears to be increasing.
Consequently no single firm has sufficient resources to maintain itself at the leading-edge
of knowledge.  The upshot has been the emergence of a new organisational structure -
strategic alliances - in order to manage innovation within dynamic market environments.
Firms have coped with the demand for new technologies not only by building up
substantial research capacities but also by research cooperation: inter-firm and firm-
academic cooperation and other research institutions (Lundvall, 1992).
Through the concept of thermodynamic openness one can usefully consider the
interaction between changes in the external environment and changes in firms’ internal
organisation.  In the face of increased technological uncertainty due to high rates of
technological change, shortening product life cycles and the need to master and synthesis
multiple technologies, strategic alliances offer a means of reducing risk by reducing each
firm’s exposure in a new technology field and by increasing leverage over the innovation
process.  In adopting this form of structural organisation, firms seek to maintain relative
stability within their institutions while simultaneously generating supernormal profits
through high rates of product and process innovation.  This drive for relative internal
stability in the face of high market uncertainty is not readily dealt with by transactions
cost approach.
The issue of supernormal profits also exposes problems in the resource-base approach.
Dynamic product markets are characterised by both a rapid rate of technological change
and by the rapid diffusion of new ideas and technologies (Abernathy and Utterback,
1975).  It is these twin conditions that encourage the development of radically new
products in order to capture premium market segments or to pre-empt competitors’ entry
(Utterback, 1994).  Through product innovation, a firm proactively seeks to push out the
technological frontier in order to influence the industry’s evolution in its favour by
shaping product design and configuration, establishing the rules of competition in its
favour.  A high degree of uncertainty and fluidity is associated with the creation and
introduction of radically new technology products.  Uncertainty with respect to market
size, product design, consumer tastes and technological constraints often leads to a
variety of designs being offered, reflecting different firms’ bets about the future.  As
highlighted in the literature on product life cycles, the period of technological uncertainty
may end following the emergence of one or a small number of designs that are stable
enough (i.e. profitable and technically feasible) to support a significant volume of
production (Dalle, 1997; Windrum and Birchenhall, 1998).  However, as Schumpeter
observed long ago, monopoly or supernormal rents are temporary in dynamic market
environments (Schumpeter, 1912).  New knowledge generated by their innovative
behaviour diffuses into a common knowledge pool and can be built upon by subsequent
innovators.
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Tacit and codified knowledge are not fixed entities.  Over time, what is initially
specialised and tacit knowledge held by individuals is translated into a codified form and
transferred.  Indeed knowledge transfer is important to the development of both firms and
national economies.  Modern economic growth theory treats knowledge generation and
diffusion as endogenous components of economic development (Romer, 1990; Nelson
and Plosser, 1982; Kydland and Prescott, 1982).   Further, it is argued that the success of
many firms is based on improvements in absorptive capacity – the ability to acquire and
assimilate new technological knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Arora and
Gambardella, 1994) – and by the ability to internally transfer knowledge between an
organisation’s business units (Szulanski, 1996).  The tacitness of knowledge is thus a
short-term phenomenon.  The self-organisation perspective of strategic alliance formation
developed here emphasises thermodynamic openness – the generation and diffusion of
new knowledge across different industrial sectors and between industrial and scientific
domains – as the key factor that sustains variety over the long-term.
3.3.2  Local interaction
As discussed in section 2, the self-organisation approach places great stress on the
inability to deduce macro behaviour from the behaviour of an ‘average’ or
‘representative’ individual.  Strategic alliances are a product of the interactions of
heterogeneous firms.  Operationalising the approach therefore not only requires a
specification of the dimensions of heterogeneity amongst firms and the rules that govern
the individual behaviour of these firms but also the rules governing the interaction
between firms.  This contrasts sharply with the more traditional methodological approach
of both transaction cost theory and resource-based theory.  There the procedure is to first
construct a representative agent.  By assuming that there is no interaction term between
the behaviour of this agent and its external environment, the analysis considers the
decision-making of this (boundedly) rational agent based on optimisation calculus.
Interdependence in decision-making has been highlighted in the game theoretic literature
following Axelrod’s (1980, 1981) discussion of cooperation in two-person prisoner
dilemma models.  Axelrod showed that cooperative solutions are possible when agents
pursue tit-for-tat strategies and the expected time horizon of the game is infinite.  The
information gathering and processing demands made upon agents are high in these
models: each agent is assumed to know the pay-offs associated with each and every
action.  Interdependence in decision-making has also been examined in Polya-Urn
models by Arthur in his discussion of de facto product standards (Arthur et al., 1985;
Arthur et al., 1987; Arthur, 1989).  The informational demands made of agents is far
more relaxed.  Faced by a choice between two alternative technology products, agents are
myopic in their decision-making and take into account the prior choices made by other
agents in the past.  Interdependence leads to path dependency and convergence in the
model to one or other alternative.  Kirman (1997) notes that path dependency depends on
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two features of the model.  The first is an increasing size of population - the Polya Urn
model assumes an indefinitely increasing population in order to establish asymptotic
results. The second is the strictly sequential nature of decision-making in the model.
Bassanini and Dosi (1998) add that the convergence result only strictly holds when
returns to adoption are linearly increasing and there is homogeneity of consumer
preferences (or at least the degree of heterogeneity is small).
In this paper we are similarly interested in the way in which individual behaviour that is
influenced by prevailing conditions; specifically, the degree to which decisions to
cooperate are influenced by the degree of cooperation already present in the industry and
how this interdependence of decision-making may lead to asymptotic convergence to an
equilibrium in which cooperative alliances prevail.  Furthermore, we are interested in
examining the extent to which interdependence is a key factor compared with factors
such as the technological intensity of an industry and the relative costs of cooperation.
In the self-organisation model presented in section 4, we consider the possibility of lock-
in effects arising when pay-offs are not known ex ante (as they are in Axelrod’s model)
and where the sustainability of cooperation is not dependent on increasing numbers of
new entrants (as they are in the Polya-Urn model).
In explicitly taking into account the interaction between individual agents, the self-
organisation approach highlights the co-evolutionary dynamics of firm and industry
innovation.  Firms engage in innovation in order to bring about market changes that are
favourable to their continued success and profitability.  At the same time, the behaviour
of other firms in the industry influences a firm’s current behaviour.  In this respect it is
interesting to contrast Nelson’s discussion of knowledge trading with that of von Hippel
(see above).  Like von Hippel, Nelson (1988) suggests that a more liberal attitude towards
knowledge exchange is emerging, noting that “in some cases firms take positive actions
to make their proprietary knowledge available to others” (Nelson, 1988, p. 318).
However the strategic motivation suggested by Nelson is very different to that put
forward by von Hippel.  On the one hand, Nelson states that changing environmental
conditions - increasing complexity and high rates of innovative change - are to some
extent forcing firms to a adopt a more open position.  In addition, he observes that
diffusing certain types of know-how can be beneficial.  If a firm’s proprietary technology
becomes the industry standard then it gains enormous advantages because all subsequent
innovations that built on that standard are readily understood and absorbed by the
standard-setter.  In this way Nelson makes a link with work on systemic lock-in.
Discussions of interaction lead us to consider the creation of joint social capital within
strategic alliances, the specificity of this capital and the effect of this specificity on
opportunism.  The absorption and synthesis of multiple technologies is not easy to
manage or exploit.  It is a creative act that invariably generates a fresh set of technical
problems that need to be solved.  Success depends not only on the technical competences
of the individual firms making up a strategic alliance but also on inter-firm learning.
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Collaboration between firms holding complementary assets requires the creation and
management of linkages between their respective competences and knowledge bases.
This entails an understanding of what partners can reasonably expect of each other (their
relative strengths and weaknesses) and how partners’ competences can be synthesised
together to create an innovative product.  In effect, this represents the creation of social
capital, an intermediate good that is used along with other inputs to produce R&D.  This
social capital is highly specific to the particular alliance in which it is created.  It is highly
specialised, cumulatively created over time and thus premised on the establishment of
stable, long-term relationships.  In addition to economies due to learning-by-doing and
learning-by-using, this social capital – embodied in the construction of inter-firm routines
and experience - gives rise to economies due to learning-by-cooperating.  The presence of
these economies, the expected long-term returns to cooperation, and the sunk cost nature
of these social capital investments, may be sufficient to keep in check short-term
opportunism amongst alliance partners.
3.3.3 Non-linearity of interactions
The effects and benefits derived from inter-firm learning and cooperation are likely to be
non-linear over time.  There are a number of reasons for this.  First, due to market and
technological limitations, the opportunities of collaboration in a particular sector are not
unrestricted.  Second, one of the implications of mutual learning over the longer term is a
reduction of dissimilarity between partners and an undermining of the stability of the
alliance.  With the depletion of these opportunities, cooperation becomes less attractive.
Applying Kuhn’s (1962) theory of scientific paradigms to the technological domain,
Frenken and Verbart (1998) observe that the problem-solving capacity of a technology is
influenced by the number of previous contributors to a technology.  As the number of
contributors increases in the initial phase of its history, so the problem-solving capacity of
the network supporting that technology increases exponentially due to gains in the division
of labour and benefits arising from new fields of application.  There is, however, an upper
limit to the problem-solving capacity of a user network.  As a technology paradigm matures,
so co-ordination costs start to outweigh the gains derived through further divisions of labour.
The ability to identify and develop new fields of application is similarly limited and
anomalies signal open questions that are considered to be beyond solution within the
technology’s framework.  Consequently the growth of problem-solving capacity begins to
slow to a standstill.  Frenken and Verbart suggest that the functional form of the relationship
between the problem-solving capacity of a technology and the number of contributors is
likely to be sigmoid.
Turning to the relationship between learning benefits and the degree of differentiation
between alliance members, resource-based theory emphasises that learning benefits are
greatest in alliances containing firms that are highly dissimilar with respect to their
resource portfolios.  Yet one of the implications of mutual learning over the longer term
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is a reduction of dissimilarity between partners and, hence, an undermining of the
stability of the alliance.  Heterogeneity of firms within an alliance decreases because they
become technologically closer through the very act of sharing their know-how.  Dodgson
notes that if firms “share knowledge over a longer period, then they will increasingly
come to resemble one another with detrimental consequences for novelty and innovation”
(Dodgson, 1996, p. 67).  Since heterogeneity is a necessary precondition for spill-overs
with high information content, increasing homogeneity makes further exchanges less
attractive (there is less to be ‘exchanged’) leading to decreasing returns to cooperation.
Consequently one would not expect the beneficial effects of mutual learning in a
cooperative environment to increase linearly ad infinitum but, rather, to be bound from
above.  Depending on the particular form which this function takes, the relationship
between returns and membership size will either be sigmoid or else an upper-bound log
function consistent with a traditional diminishing returns-type argument.
3.3.4 Emergence
Multi-scale effects are likely to be present, with a second feedback loop existing between
the emerging organisational structures observed in an industry and individual decision-
making.  If the returns to cooperative R&D conducted within an alliance are frequency-
dependent, i.e. returns depends on the share of firms engaged in an innovation alliance,
then bandwagons can arise.  If the number of cooperating firms is increasing, the gains to
cooperative behaviour increase on average, making it more attractive for other firms to
join an innovation alliance. One may reasonably expect to see a positive feedback
between individual decisions to invest in collective knowledge production, the economic
returns to each member of an alliance, and an increasingly open attitude towards further
knowledge sharing.  Alternatively, a negative feedback can arise if an increasing number
of firms decide to leave their respective innovation alliances in order to innovate
independently.  Then the returns to cooperating will decline on average, reducing still
further the incentive to belong to an innovation alliance.
Cooperative structures can emerge as an ‘institution’, where an institution is defined as an
observed regularity in the behaviour and/or actions of individuals or groups when they
encounter a similar set of circumstances.  Once established, an institution has an
important influence on individuals’ expectations of the future, locking in the system to a
stable long-run structure (Witt, 1987, p. 87).  We have noted how the prediction of
cooperative behaviour differs between transaction costs theory and resource-based
theory.  Transaction costs theory suggests alliances are unstable if assets are highly
specific while resource-based theory proposes that, despite assets being highly specific, a
strategic alliance will be stable provided the benefits are evenly distributed amongst the
members.  The self-organisational perspective emphasises that asset specificity and
relative coordination costs can be outweighed by other factors, notably micro-macro
15
interactions, which lead to the institutionalisation of cooperative or competitive
behaviour.
4. MODELLING THE SELF-ORGANISATION OF STRATEGIC
ALLIANCES
In order to further investigate the factors affecting the formation of horizontal R&D
alliances in dynamic markets, we present a self-organisation model that builds on
previous work by Pyka (1999). The model draws on Haken’s synergetic approach
(Haken, 1978) and is based on a Master-Equation algorithm (see Weidlich and Haag,
1983).  The other notable feature of the model is its evolutionary character.  Unlike more
traditional neo-classical approaches, an optimisation calculus is no longer employed.
Rather, the evolution of an alliance structure depends on the technological intensity of the
industry, the relative costs of cooperation and competition, and the prevailing degree of
cooperation.
The model contains a population of firms (agents) that collectively make up an industry.
In every period, each firm must decide whether to ‘join an innovation alliance’ or else ‘go
it alone’.  A firm that joins an alliance chooses to act cooperatively, voluntarily disclosing
its existing (including newly acquired) know-how and exchanging this knowledge with
other firms.  This creates the basis for an informal innovation alliance in which
knowledge is pooled.  Alternatively, if a firm decides to act independently then it does
not disclose its existing know-how and competes directly with all other firms.  The need
to exchange knowledge and access external knowledge sources increases when a firm can
no longer reasonably expect to be successful through its own efforts.  This is particularly
true if the innovation process is characterised by increasing complexity and accelerating
rate of change.  In making their decisions, firms are strongly influenced by the choices of
other firms within the same competitive environment.  Hence one would expect strong
bandwagon effects as decisions to act cooperatively are affected by the numbers of firms
that already engage in cooperation.
Equilibrium in this model arises when the macro structure is stable. Changes in behaviour
can still continue to occur at the individual micro level, however, since a macro
equilibrium only implies that the rate of change from one behaviour to another is matched
by an equal rate of change in the opposite direction.  In this model the behaviour of
interest is the choice between cooperative innovation through alliances versus
competition based on individual R&D.  The model considers the probability of a
transition from one type of behaviour to the other, i.e. from cooperative R&D to
competitive R&D strategies, or from competitive R&D to cooperative R&D.  The switch
from one behaviour to another is described by ‘individual transition rates’.  These
transition rates are the key aspect of a Master-Equation which describes the probability of
16
an agent changing its behaviour.  There are two conditions under which there is a high
probability of a firm changing its behaviour.  The first is when the size of the cooperative
environment is growing.  If the number of cooperating firms - and hence the returns to
the external knowledge pool - is growing, the gains of cooperative behaviour increases,
making it more attractive for other firms to join the strategic alliance.  The second case
occurs when the opposite conditions prevail.  There is a high probability of a firm
changing its behaviour when the size of the cooperative environment is declining.  If the
environment is initially cooperative but there is an increasing number of firms who
decide to leave the alliance(s) and to innovate independently, then returns to the external
knowledge pool will decline, further reducing the attractiveness of belonging to an
alliance.  To summarise, the probability of switching to cooperative behaviour increases
as an alliance grows in size while the probability of switching to competitive behaviour
increases as an alliance declines in size.  This mutual learning process reflects the first
characteristic of self-organising systems: local interaction.
The behavioural rule followed by firms in our model is very simple.  Each firm considers
the structure of the innovation environment by taking into account whether other firms
are currently cooperating or competing, and the relative costs of setting up an alliance
versus the costs of conducting in-house R&D.  In marked contrast to transaction cost and
resource-based models, this avoids placing high demands on the ability of firms to
initially gather information and estimate the skills and competences of potential partners
and/or the long-term gains of cooperation.  The transition rate of competitive (c) to
cooperative (co) behaviour pc→co in the model depends on two components, (i) the
positive returns associated with alliance size and (ii) the costs of establishing and
coordinating a strategic alliance.  These are captured respectively in the left- and right-
hand terms of equation (1).
)]exp(1/[)exp()( 21 xxxp coc +−⋅⋅=→ αβα ; x∈{0,1}, αi∈{0,1}, β>0 (1)
The size of an alliance is described along a discrete state space x giving the particular
distribution of cooperative firms and non-cooperative firms. x = 0 when there is a purely
competitive environment, x = 1 if all firms participate in a strategic alliance, and x = 0.5
when there is an equal distribution of cooperative and competitive firms.  αi is a
frequency parameter and β is the degree of technological intensity.
The exponential formulation of the transition rates captures the second characteristic of
self-organising systems: non-linearity giving rise to a positive feedback gains that are
bounded from above.  Positive returns associated with alliance size arise from the
beneficial effects of cooperative mutual learning discussed in section 3.  As an alliance
expands, so the returns to mutual learning increase over time.  However, there are two
reasons why one would not expect these positive returns to be linearly increasing in the
long run.  First, the performance improvements that can be gained from continued
development of a particular technology, and the range of its potential application, are not
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unrestricted.  With the depletion of technological opportunities, the returns to continued
investment in this technology, and the particular structure in which technological
innovation is coordinated, becomes less attractive.  Second, following Dodgson (1996),
the heterogeneity of firms within an alliance may decrease over the long-run through the
very act of sharing information and know-how.  If, as resource-based theory argues,
heterogeneity is a necessary condition for strategic alliance formation because spill-overs
have a high information content, then increasing homogeneity of the members of an
alliance makes further exchanges less attractive (there is less to be ‘exchanged’) leading
to decreasing returns to alliance membership.
The costs of coordinating innovation within a strategic alliance are also likely to be non-
linear over the long-run.  This is captured by the frequency parameter α2, with positive
cooperation costs that have an upper bound.  As discussed in section 3, firms typically
experience difficulties in drawing on the external knowledge sources of their partners in
the initial phase of an alliance and the knowledge flows within an alliance are not easily
used for a firm’s own purposes.  However, partners build social capital over time and
develop understandings that are translated into routines and experience.  These routines
and experience can in turn make future cooperation with additional partners easier to
facilitate.  Through learning-by-cooperating the marginal cost of additional cooperative
activity will begin to decrease.  In terms of alliance size, this learning-by-cooperating
effect can lead to economies of scale, enabling larger sustainable alliances to form.
Turning to the transition rate of cooperative (co) to competitive (c) behaviour pco→c, this
similarly depends two factors.  These are (i) the returns associated with alliance size and
(ii) the costs of establishing and coordinating an independent in-house R&D facility.
These are captured respectively in two terms of equation (2).
)]exp(1/[)exp()( 31 xxxp cco +−⋅−⋅=→ αβα ; x∈{0,1}, αi∈{0,1}, β>0 (2)
We observe that there is no reason to assume that the costs associated with each strategy
will be identical.  Indeed, as observed in section 3, an important issue driving much of the
empirical debate concerns the costs of establishing and coordinating an independent in-
house R&D facility vis-à-vis the costs of establishing and coordinating a strategic
innovation alliance.  If the relative costs of pursuing each strategy differ then the
transition rates will not be perfectly symmetric with respect to switches between
competitive and cooperative behaviours.
Ceteris paribus, the restricted technological opportunities of a specific technological path
will tend to reduce the dynamics of technological evolution, with similar effects on the
importance of cooperation and mutual learning.  However, as discussed in section 3,
technological evolution is characterised by mutual interdependencies between different
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core technologies.  New technological opportunities can be created through the fusion of,
what were previously thought of as unrelated, knowledge fields.  The other key source of
interaction discussed in section 2 is between technological and scientific knowledge
bases, developments in each frequently having impacts on the other.  These cross
fertilisations sustain the heterogeneity of technological approaches across firms in a
dynamic perspective and correspond to the first feature of self-organising systems:
thermodynamic openness.  The particular choice of exponential transition rates allows to
overcome the restrictions of exploiting intensive technological opportunities only by also
exploring new extensive technological opportunities emerging within a technology
intensive environment. By this, the system is prevented from falling into a local
equilibrium and reaching stasis.
Using the transition rates of equations (1) and (2) we form a Master-Equation.  The
Master-Equation is used to compute the probability of a change from one type of
behaviour to another (i.e. from competition to cooperation or vice-versa) at each moment




 existing in each time period.  The Master-Equation for the system of
evolving strategic alliances is a stochastic differential equation.
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The master-equation can be thought of as an accounting device that provides information
on the probability of a specific configuration x occurring at time t.  This probability can
change due to four different probability fluxes describing movements out and into a
specific state.  The above two terms with a positive sign capture the positive effect on
state x arising from a change in probability fluxes from a neighbouring state (x-ε or x+ε).
Changes in these aggregate probability fluxes are driven by movements of individual
firms between neighbouring states. These arise whenever firms decide to change their
behaviour and either join an strategic alliance (x-ε) or else leave an alliance and ‘go it
alone’ (x+ε).  In either case, the probability that a specific configuration x (distribution of
cooperative and competitive firms) will dominate the system increases as a consequence
of a flux from one behavioural state to another.  The below two terms with a negative
sign capture the negative impact of a probability flux, due to departing firms who have
changed their behaviour, on the original behavioural state.  Changes in firm behaviour
decrease this probability, raising the probability of attraction to a neighbouring state.
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5. RESULTS
5.1 Mean field analysis
As a first approximation, we formally analyse a simple version of the model using the
Mean Field method.  The aim here is to obtain a qualitative appreciation of the behaviour
of the model prior to simulation.  This is a useful means of focusing the simulation
experiments that are subsequently conducted on the model. The limits of applicability of
the method are an advanced topic in statistical physics and a full discussion of these is
beyond the scope of the current paper.  However, even in those case cases where its
predictions are quantitatively inaccurate, the method is good enough to predict phase
transitions and some dynamical properties in their neighbourhood (Brout, 1965;
Weisbuch et al., 2000).
The Mean Field method replaces randomly fluctuating quantities by their average, thus
neglecting their fluctuations.  In this case we apply the method to a simple version of the
model where the costs of cooperative R&D are equal to the costs of in-house R&D for all
firms.  Making α2 = α3, we analyse the state space x describing the distribution of
cooperative firms n1 and non-cooperative firms n2.  For each value of x the share of
cooperative and non-cooperative firms is computed using the formula x=2(n1-0.5)=2(0.5-
n2).  The mean value is derived by summing the net rate of behavioural changes
)()( 12 xpnxpnx coccco →→ ⋅−⋅=? .  The Mean Field approximation consists of replacing x?
by the expected value <x>, thereby transforming the stochastic differential equation into







                                                
2 See Weidlich/Haag (1983). The state space x describes the particular distribution of cooperative firms n1
and non-cooperative firms n2.  For each value of x it is straightforward to compute the share of cooperative
and non-cooperative firms respectively, following the formula: x=2(n1-0.5)=2(0.5-n2).  Using this, we
derive the mean-value equation by summing up the net rate of behavioural changes
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Using the Mean Field method we are able to identify three possible equilibrium states in
this system; (i) coexistence of cooperative and competitive behaviour, (ii) dominance by
cooperative behaviour and (iii) dominance by competitive behaviour.  Moreover, it is
found that convergence to a particular equilibrium state is sensitive to changes in the
value of the technology intensity parameter (β).  Indeed, as the bifurcation diagram in
figure 1 shows, the Mean Field method predicts the system undergoes a phase transition
at β=1.  For β values below 1, the equilibrium solution has a mean distribution of 0.5
between cooperative and competitive firms.  This corresponds to a state of maximum
entropy, as discussed in section 2.  We call this a disorganised regime since one cannot
predict ex ante whether a firm picked at random will be cooperative or competitive in
behaviour.
By contrast, the model is characterised by ordered regimes for values of β greater than 1.
These ordered regimes arise from initially disordered conditions.  It is interesting to note
that the system has two alternative development paths when β>1.  The system may either
converge to an ordered regime of cooperative R&D or, alternatively, an ordered regime
of competitive R&D.  This supports the earlier discussion regarding the emergence of
very different institutions for innovation between within sectors which are otherwise very
similar.
The existence of a phase transition highlights the fourth characteristic of self-organising
systems: the emergence of discrete and highly differentiated macro patterns that are due
to small changes in micro behaviour.  In this case, significantly different industry
structures arise at higher technological intensities where β>1 (i.e. fast pace of
technological progress, cross-fertilisation effects, inputs from the scientific realm etc.).
Below a particular threshold, cooperative and competitive behaviours can co-exist in
comparatively egalitarian distributions.  However, above this threshold the system tends
towards end states in which one or other behaviour dominates.
Unfortunately the limitations of the Mean Field method are such that we cannot
investigate the way in which small fluctuations in behaviour and in initial conditions
affect the final outcome of the system when β>1.  In addition to examining the way in
which the system’s development path is affected by random events, we wish to explore
the impact of differences in the relative cost of collaboration and competition as well as
the degree of technological intensity.  In order to conduct this analysis we next turn to the









Figure 1.  The order/disorder transition in β
5.2 SIMULATION ANALYSIS
Unfortunately, given its highly non-linear character, traditional analytic methods do not
assist the investigation of this model’s properties.  The mean-value approach only
provides a good approximation in cases where the system has not undergone a phase
transition. However, once a system has undergone a phase transition, the approach can
generate unlikely results3.  Consequently one is forced to turn to computer-based
numerical techniques in order to obtain an accurate description of the system’s behaviour.
Before discussing the simulation results, some preliminary remarks need to be made
regarding the reported simulation exercises.  The model was run for 2,000 periods for
each simulation.  The frequency parameters α1 and α2 were fixed at 0.25 and 0.01
                                                
3 See Erdmann (1993).
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respectively for all simulation runs.  Finally, the initial distribution is P(x=0;1) = 0.5, i.e.
there was an equal probability of cooperative and competing firms at the outset of each
simulation run.  In the first scenario, we explore the behaviour of the system when
technological intensity is relatively low (β = 0.8).  Figure 2 illustrates the type of
probability distributions P(x) that emerge in order to meet a certain alliance size x over
time t.  It was found that the system tends to converge to a uni-modal stationary solution
in which the population of firms is divided between two equivalently sized groups, one
acting cooperatively and the other competitively.  Thus, in a sector in which
technological change is not a key factor, the existence of an upper bound to alliance
benefits prevents the formation of larger alliances.  Technological opportunities are
quickly depleted and the low degree of heterogeneity amongst firms means the benefits to




Figure 2.  System development with technological intensity β < 1
Figure 3 illustrates a second scenario where technological intensity β = 1.  This
approaches the critical value identified by our earlier investigation of the mean-value
equation.  While the median of the end state is the same as the first scenario, it takes
longer for the system to reach a stationary distribution.  What is more, the final
distribution is considerably different to that which emerges under the first scenario
(Figure 2).  The distribution that emerges under the second scenario contains two local
maxima, one slightly biased on the (left) cooperative side and another that is more
marked towards the (right) competitive side.  Thus the system is beginning to shows






Figure 3.  System development with technological intensity β = 1
Figure 4 illustrates a third scenario in which there is a high technological intensity, β =
1.25.  The end state that emerges at this level of technological intensity differs
significantly to the previous cases.  Here the system undergoes a bifurcation such that
dominance by one type of behaviour – either competition or cooperation through strategic
alliances – is the most probable end state.  It is not possible to predict ex-ante which of
these behaviours will dominate because convergence to one or the other end state
critically depends on fluctuations that occur during the phase-transition.  Despite the
exploitation of intensive technological opportunities, technology maintains its importance
in time via the exploration of extensive technological opportunities, making it attractive





Figure 4.  System development with technological intensity β > 1
This type of solution has been observed in empirical case studies conducted by Eliasson
(1995).  For example, innovation alliances play a dominant role in sectors such as semi-
conductors and biotechnology-based combinatorial chemistry.  These fields of knowledge
production are characterised by significant technological dynamics and by firms that are
highly inter-dependent.  Firms are apparently unable to be individually self-sufficient in
the acquisition of critical complementary knowledge, participation in informal alliances
being a decisive mechanism through which firms seek to maintain themselves at the
leading edge of the technological frontier.  Yet this form of cooperative know-how
exchange is more or less absent in sectors that are equally technologically dynamic and
have ostensibly similar characteristics.  In chemistry, for example, we see an industry
structure in which firms are more or less self-sufficient in the production of critical
complementary knowledge through in-house R&D activities.
The self-organisation model has a number of interesting properties.  First, the results
accord with von Hippel’s empirical observations regarding the willingness of firms to
engage in informal knowledge trading.  However the model is able to generate these
without making strong assumptions (as von Hippel did) about the abilities of individual
agents to collect, evaluate and compare all internally- and externally-held information.  In
this model agents’ decisions on whether to cooperate in strategic alliances depend upon
the size of the cooperative environment, whether this is growing or declining, and the
costs of cooperation.  If the number of cooperating firms - and hence the returns to the
external knowledge pool - is growing, the gains of cooperative behaviour increases,
making it more attractive for other firms to join the strategic alliance.
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This leads us to a second property of the model.  Multi-scale effects arise due to local
interactions between agents generate cooperative and competitive aggregate structures
which in turn affect individual decision-making.  Hence stable and ordered paths of
change emerge as the (partly) unintentional outcome of interactions between individual
agents.  This result nicely illustrates Nelson’s point that the basis of cooperative
innovation is not only to be found in strategic decision-making but is strongly influenced
by the industrial environment in which firms operate.  Finally, the model contains
multiple possible end-states.  Convergence to one or other end state depends on small
differences that occur at crucial points in time.  This emphasises the point made by
Silverberg et al. regarding the nature of uncertainty in real historical time (also see Arthur
(1989) and David (1985) on this point).  Decisions in our model are frequency-dependent
and so it is impossible to predict ex ante which type of behaviour will eventually come to
dominate.  Given this interdependence between firms’ strategic choices, bandwagon
effects can quickly spread as a result of previous changes in behaviour.  As a
consequence, selection of one or other end state is non-ergodic and highly sensitive to the
way in which the sequence of decisions are built up.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The model presented in the paper offers a promising avenue for the study of strategic
alliances.  To begin with, the model is founded on a general framework of dynamic
systems, a framework under which a largely fragmented body of research can be drawn
together.  Second, the self-organisation framework offers a set of modelling techniques
capable of generating new insights.  In this paper the focus has been the rationale for
cooperative behaviour by firms within horizontally structured strategic alliances.  Three
key factors have been considered: the relative coordination costs of cooperation and
competition, the rate of technological innovation in the sector, and the institutional
history of the industry.
Transferring the core concepts and modelling methods of self-organisation theory from
natural to social science domains is a non-trivial task and must be handled with care.  For
this reason the paper began by identifying the four key principles of self-organisation -
local interaction, non-linearity, thermodynamic openness and emergence – and thereafter
proceeded to identify a set of stylised facts of inter-firm cooperation within formal and
informal strategic alliances that can be brought together under the self-organisation
rubric. This prepared the way for the formal model of self-organising strategic alliances
presented in section 4 of the paper.
Turning to the formal findings of the paper, the experiments conducted on the model
offer a number of interesting insights into the dynamics of strategic alliances.  First, in
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accordance with von Hippel’s empirical observations, cooperative structures can emerge
in which individual firms willingly engage in informal knowledge trading.  However,
unlike von Hippel, the model can generate these results without recourse to strong
assumptions regarding the information processing abilities of individual agents.  In our
model individuals learn by reinforcing the actions that were most profitable in the past.
The behavioural rule considers the network externality associated with cooperation and
competition, and the relative costs of establishing an alliance or conducting in-house
R&D.
Turning to the three factors considered in the model, it is found that, ceteris paribus, the
relative costs of strategic alliances and in-house R&D only have a bearing in the limit.
Only under exceptional circumstances will the relative costs of coordination lead to a
purely competitive distribution (x = 0) or a purely cooperative distribution (x = 1).  The
second factor examined, the technological intensity (β) of the sector, if found to have a
far more significant effect on the final outcome however.  In both the mean field and
simulation exercises a bifurcation point is established at β=1.  For β values below 1 there
is a disorganised regime with maximum entropy (x = 0.5).  Ordered regimes in which
competitive or cooperative distributions are stable occur when β is greater than 1.
Finally, the model contributes to the current debate on strategic alliances by highlighting
the importance of micro-macro feedbacks between individuals’ decision-making and
emergent institutional environments.  The presence of order in innovation is very
dependent on, and sensitive to, the way in which agents react to their previous
experience.  Convergence to competitive or cooperative equilibria depends on the
sequence of decisions that are built up over time.  At the same time, the mutual
interdependence of individual choices means that payoffs are frequency dependent.  This
can readily lead to multi-scale bandwagon effects because interactions between agents
generate ordered structures that in turn influence future decisions.  The net result is a
coevolution of innovation structure and profitability within an industry.  Yet one cannot
predict ex ante whether a competitive or a cooperative structure will emerge.  Alternative
outcomes can emerge in different industries even though firms within those industries
face similar transaction costs, levels of technological uncertainty and asset specificity.
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